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Abstract
Although the importance of communication is recognized in several disciplines, it is rarely studied in the context of online
social interactions and joint actions. During online joint actions, language and gesture are often insufficient and humans
typically use non-verbal, sensorimotor forms of communication to send coordination signals. For example, when playing
volleyball, an athlete can exaggerate her movements to signal her intentions to her teammates (say, a pass to the right) or
to feint an adversary. Similarly, a person who is transporting a table together with a co-actor can push the table in a certain
direction to signal where and when he intends to place it. Other examples of ‘‘signaling’’ are over-articulating in noisy
environments and over-emphasizing vowels in child-directed speech. In all these examples, humans intentionally modify
their action kinematics to make their goals easier to disambiguate. At the moment no formal theory exists of these forms of
sensorimotor communication and signaling. We present one such theory that describes signaling as a combination of a
pragmatic and a communicative action, and explains how it simplifies coordination in online social interactions. We cast
signaling within a ‘‘joint action optimization’’ framework in which co-actors optimize the success of their interaction and
joint goals rather than only their part of the joint action. The decision of whether and how much to signal requires solving a
trade-off between the costs of modifying one’s behavior and the benefits in terms of interaction success. Signaling is thus
an intentional strategy that supports social interactions; it acts in concert with automatic mechanisms of resonance,
prediction, and imitation, especially when the context makes actions and intentions ambiguous and difficult to read. Our
theory suggests that communication dynamics should be studied within theories of coordination and interaction rather
than only in terms of the maximization of information transmission.
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Introduction
The study of human communication is central in several
disciplines, including linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience,
anthropology, biology, and philosophy [1–5]. Most studies have
focused on linguistic communication or non-linguistic forms such
as gesture, deictics (e.g., pointing, using turn signals when driving,
or looking at objects to help another’s referential processes), facial
expressions, body language and posture.
Less attention has been devoted to human sensorimotor communi-
cation during online social interactions and joint actions, such as for
instance when two persons play volleyball or jointly lift a table.
Unlike conversation, these joint actions are not exclusively
communicative but have non-communicative, pragmatic goals
(winning a match or transporting the table somewhere). Still, as
recognized by early scholars [4,6–8] and also more recently [9],
joint actions offer a vantage point from which to study
communication and its origins.
In online sensorimotor interactions and joint actions, commu-
nication is not only linguistic. Several studies have focused on
other forms of communication, which include deictics, gesturing,
and facial expressions, see [10] for a recent review. A common
feature of all these forms of communication is that the ‘‘channel’’
used for communication (say, language or gaze) is different from
the channel used for action (say, the movements required to pass
the ball in a volleyball game or to lift a table). In this article we
focus instead in a less-studied form of communication that uses the
same channel as the to-be-executed action. Consider the case of a
volleyball player exaggerating her movements to help her
teammates discriminating between a pass to the right or left. In
this case, the same channel (i.e. hand and body movements) is used
for both reaching/lifting and sending coordination signals to the
co-actor.
How can we distinguish when a given action (say, making a
pass) is used for its pragmatic goal (e.g., passing the ball to the
teammate) or for signaling something to a co-actor (e.g., letting her
infer the direction of the pass)? Evidence accumulates that
distinguishing features can be found at the kinematic level. For
example, it has been reported that in social contexts actions have
subtle still significant kinematic peculiarities: the deceleration
phase was slower when a ‘‘giving’’ action was directed to another
individual that in an individualistic set-up (placing an object) [11].
In turn, these subtle changes in the action kinematics are highly
informative of the performer’s goals and might help inferring their
distal intentions; thus, they have communicative and not only
pragmatic effects [12–14]. Other studies have reported that co-
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actors engaged in joint actions modify the kinematics of their
actions, and in particular make their behavior more predictable
and discriminable [15–18]. This can be done by minimizing its
variance [19] or selecting trajectories that permit a faster
disambiguation of the action from the alternatives [16,17]. In a
previous study we found that in joint actions with asymmetric
knowledge (e.g., only one of the co-actors knew the joint goal) the
knowledgeable subject modified her actions, and stopped doing so
when the co-actor’s uncertainty lowered, showing that the
signaling mechanisms can adapt flexibly to task demands [20].
Note that signaling is not limited to one modality but can exploit
multiple communication channels such as visuomotor, auditory,
and haptic coupling [21]. Furthermore, signaling can be used at a
larger scale than in the previous examples; for instance in the
coordination of an entire orchestra, and be responsible for the
quality of the artistic results [22].
Sensorimotor strategies of communication can also work
synergistically with other forms of communication (e.g., linguistic).
It has been consistently reported that child-directed speech (a
‘‘motherese’’) has certain characteristics that facilitate recognition
and perceptual processing, such as for instance an exaggeration of
the vowels [23]. Mothers’ infant-directed action (‘‘motionese’’) has
similar characteristics of the motherese, including the ‘‘exagger-
ations’’ and the choice of actions that have low perceptual
ambiguity [24,25]. Exaggeration is not the only strategy; speaking
slower achieves the same goal. Besides teaching, signaling helps
conveying communicative intentions when the context makes
them ambiguous. For example, interlocutors often over-articulate
and modulate their choice of words to help the receiver’s
perceptual processing in noisy environments (the so-called Lombard
effect). Studies of sign language reveal dissimilation effects, too:
performers chose movement parameters that make two successive
actions more easily discriminable for the perceiver [26]. Exagger-
ation of movements can be used to convey misleading commu-
nicative messages, too, such as when feinting in soccer [27,28].
Despite these empirical demonstrations, the nature and
functioning of human sensorimotor communication is largely
unknown. There is currently no normative framework or analytic
description of human signaling and sensorimotor communication
that provides them with a theoretical ground. Besides its
importance per se, the study of sensorimotor communication
provides an excellent opportunity to understand the adaptive and
evolutionary value of communication in terms of coordination and
interaction success. Indeed, joint action scenarios are interesting
because they are not essentially communicative but have first and
foremost pragmatic goals. This makes it possible to study the
trade-offs between the costs and benefits of communication in
terms of interaction success, not (only) of communication success,
as it is instead common in theories focusing on maximization of
information transmission.
Overview of the Proposed Theory
In this article we present a formal theory of signaling in online
sensorimotor interactions. Signaling refers to the intentional
modification of one’s own behavior to convey information to
another person, typically a co-actor. In addition to a pragmatic
goal (e.g., performing the joint task), the signaler generally has the
communicative goal of changing the co-actor’s belief (e.g.,
facilitate his understanding of the signaler’s goals). In some cases,
but not always, the signaler wants also the co-actor to be aware
that she is intentionally communicating or cooperating. Note that
in competitive scenarios the signal can also be misleading (e.g., a
feint in soccer [28]). Note that our use of the term ‘‘signaling’’ is
different from the use in animal communication, because it is
intentional and tailored to the addressee and his uncertainty;
rather, the jump of a gazelle signals its strength but is less flexible
and can be executed irrespective of the presence of a mate or a
lion [29,30].
The proposed theory starts from the premise that in joint action
contexts co-actors optimize the success of joint goals (e.g., lifting a
table together) rather than their individual ones (e.g., lifting my
part of the table), and take into consideration the joint outcome
(e.g., ensure that the table surface is horizontal) and when
necessary also the parameters of the co-actor (trajectories, sensory
feedback, uncertainty, task knowledge) rather than only their own.
Signaling is part of this joint action optimization. To optimize the joint
goal, the actor can choose to pay a cost in terms of her individual
performance. For example, to make her action more predictable
and discriminable, she can chose an exaggerated trajectory
requiring higher muscular effort or a biomechanically awkward
posture.
We formalize signaling in terms of parametrizable deviations
from the action’s optimal trajectory so that the signaling action
retains its pragmatic goal (e.g., grasping an object) but the changes
in the kinematic parameters are informative of the performer’s
action choice. To choose whether or not to signal, and how much
to signal, subjects perform a cost-benefit analysis (considering, for
instance, the uncertainty of the co-actor, the accuracy of the end
state if a signaling action is selected, the usefulness of signaling by
varying one or more parameters). As it requires a cost-benefit
analysis, we consider signaling as an intentional form of
sensorimotor communication, not a byproduct of interaction
dynamics.
Our theory makes four assumptions. First, the computational
objective of signaling is permitting the co-actor to better
discriminate the signaler’s action goal (and/or distal intention)
against the alternatives (i.e., raising the co-actor’s
P(AsignalerDOsignaler), where A is the action goal of the signaler
and O is the observed movement of the signaler). As we will
discuss, because we assume that perceivers use predictive strategies
to recognize the performer’s action goal, the signaling action has to
improve the perceiver’s predictions. Second, the decision of wether
or not and how much to signal requires solving a trade-off between
the immediate costs of signaling (e.g., the biomechanical costs
linked to the execution of an awkward trajectory) and its benefits
in terms of interaction success. Third, signaling actions consist in
the dissimilation (or differentiation) of one’s own action parameters
(e.g., trajectory, speed, or hand size) from those of the alternative
actions that are most likely given the context and the perceiver’s
prior information. Fourth, our parametrization permits to select
different ‘‘degrees’’ of signaling actions, and to consider their costs
(roughly, the bigger the deviation from the optimal trajectories, the
higher the cost) in addition to their benefits (in terms of how much
signaling facilitates the discrimination of different actions by the
perceiver).
Methods
Computational Framework
The theory starts from the premise that a performer agent wants
to influence (typically facilitate) the action recognition process of a
perceiver agent. Consider the case of a volleyball player who can
execute one of two possible action alternatives: passing the ball to
the left or right. A teammate sees the scene but is uncertain relative
to the performer’s action: action 1 (say, pass to the left) or action 2
(say, pass to the right). The teammate can estimate the most likely
action of the performer based on multiple sources of information,
such as the performer’s arm trajectory, body posture, hand
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movements, gaze direction, and various kinds of prior information
(e.g. the performer’s preference and skills). The essence of our
signaling theory is that the performer can purposively modify one or
more of said variables for communicative purposes; for example,
to help the teammate recognize and predict the performed action.
Let’s describe more formally the computational problems that
performer and perceiver must solve. Each goal-directed action can
be performed in a number of different ways (e.g. a pass to the left
can be achieved in several ways). An authoritative view in
computational motor control is that each particular instantiation
of an action can be associated to an internal model m [31,32]. In
our approach, the internal model maps to a probabilistic
trajectory; each trajectory is associated to a goal-directed action
(e.g., reaching an object to the left or right). From the
computational point of view, each model (and thus a particular
action choice) can be represented as a stochastic process modeling
the temporal evolution of the system’s state. Without loss of
generality, we can represent the evolution of a model as p(xtDmi),
where xt is the state of the system at time t (e.g. the value of the
performer’s kinematic parameters at time t). By p(xDmi) instead,
we denote the entire sequence of states of the system during the
action associated to the model mi.
During an interaction, the perceiver’s goal is to infer which
model mi has generated the observed data by inverting the
generative model above (this implies that interacting agents share
similar models, and are thus able to perform similar goal-oriented
actions, see [33]). In other words, the perceiver’s goal is to infer:
argmaxip(mi Dx1:t), i[1,2, . . . n ð1Þ
where n is the number of available models (generally, the state xt
of the system is not directly observable. Rather, a set of variables ot
is observed and the distribution linking those variables to the state,
p(otDxt), is supposed to be known). For a computationally efficient
solution to this problem please consult [33].
The performer’s goal, on the other hand, is to facilitate such an
inferential process. Here we argue that this result can be achieved
by actively modifying the parameters of the currently executed
model, and thus the resulting trajectory x1:t, in order to minimize
the probability of a misclassification in Equation 1. We call this
process signaling.
Signaling Distribution
Signaling can be defined as the process of altering one’s own
behavior to facilitate its recognition by other persons. In our
framework, a signaling agent tries to ‘‘dissimilate’’ her trajectory
from the alternative ones that are possible (or likely) given the
context [26], where dissimilation is defined as the amplification of
the differences between the selected trajectory and the alternative
one(s). At the same time, however, the action choice has to be a
valid one to preserve its pragmatic effect (i.e., not to fail the action)
and make the recognition by the perceiver possible. Thus, samples
from the signaling distribution for a given model mi at time t shall
be representative of the ‘‘original’’ distribution p(xtDmi) while
having a low probability of being sampled from other competing
models, mj , in a given context.
In line with the requirements above, samples from the signaling
distribution can be obtained via a modified rejection sampling
technique [34]. Let x^t be a sample from the ‘‘ideal’’ distribution
p(xtDmi). Given K random values, uk[½0,1, sampled from the
uniform distribution over ½0,p(xtDmk)=pmaxk , we decide to accept the
sample x^t if the following holds:
uivwi:p(x^tDmi) and ujwwj :p(x^tDmj), Vj=i ð2Þ
where w~½w1,w2, . . . ,wK  is a vector of weights which modulate
the contribution of individual models to the the signaling
distribution.
In the case of continuous distributions p(xtDmj) the procedure
above leads to the formal definition of the signaling distribution:
psig(xtDmi;w)!wi:p(xtDmi)
j=i
(1{wj :p(xtDmj)=pmaxj ) ð3Þ
where pmaxj is the maximum value for the distribution p(xtDmj). By
means of p(xtDmi) it is possible to compute the entire sequence of
states of the system during the signaling of the action associated to
the model mi which we denote with p(xDmi).
To Signal or not to Signal (and How Much to Signal)
Intuitively, the signaling distribution for the model mi should be
as close as possible to the original distribution p(xDmi)~pi, while
having at the same time a high discriminative power as to facilitate
action recognition. This can be formally represented as an
optimization problem where the goal is to find the components
of the weight vector w of the signaling distribution which
minimizes the following:
wi(t)~argminw(t) KL p
sig
i (w(t)),pi
h i
zlS h{psimulatedi
 h i ð4Þ
where:
N KL(:,:) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
signaling distribution with the set of weights w and the original
one (i.e., the one with no signaling);
N l is the amount of signaling in the given action;
N psimulatedi is an estimation of the perceiver’s posterior probabil-
ity of correctly recognizing the model mi under the assumption
that performer and perceiver share the same set of internal
models;
N h is the experimentally fixed threshold that the perceiver uses
during model recognition (in our experiments, h~0:9);
N S is the logistic function.
The minimization of Eq. 4 considers jointly three factors. The
KL term considers the cost of signaling, where cost can be
associated to biomechanical factors, effort, and other forms of costs
(e.g., cognitive costs associated to planning and executing non-
familiar or non-habitual movements). The l term permits to
modulate the amount of signaling, where l~0means no signaling.
Note that our formulation permits to modulate the amount of
signaling during the task, for example signaling only during the
first part of the action or stopping signaling when the perceiver’s
feedback indicates that it is not necessary. The psimulatedi term
describes a simulation of the perceiver’s action recognition process
(for mathematical details of how to efficiently compute this
probability please refer to [20,33]. It permits estimating the
potential benefit that the perceiver will have from signaling actions
of having different l, where the benefit consists in better and faster
recognition of the executed action. All these factors are jointly
considered in the cost-benefit analysis that selects whether or not,
and how much to signal.
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Example of Signaling Distribution
As an example of signaling distribution, consider a system
governed by two independent Gaussian processes corresponding
to models m1 and m2, respectively. Assume that the system
commits to the model m1, the corresponding signaling distribution
is given by:
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For the sake of simplicity we assume that the contribution of
each internal model to the state can be expressed by a Gaussian
distribution with mean mi and a standard deviation si:
p(xDmi)~N (xDmi,si)
However, the theory is independent from the particular density
function chosen.
Results
To test our model, we performed three experiments. The first
experiment uses a synthetic dataset to tests if, when the performer
uses the signaling strategy elucidated earlier, the perceiver can
better discriminate the right action from an alternative one. The
second experiment consists in using our proposed approach to
model human data on a joint action task that requires signaling.
The third experiment is similar to the first experiment but
considers the case of three actions to be disambiguated.
Experiment 1: The Effects and Benefits of Signaling
To test the efficacy of the proposed signaling model in terms of
improved action recognition, we designed an experiment using a
synthetic dataset with two trajectories corresponding to two goal-
directed actions: A1 (e.g. reach an object to the left) and A2 (e.g.
reach an object to the right). These can be considered as
idealization of passing actions of the volleyball player (passing the
ball to the left or right). Figure 1a shows the synthetic data points
for the two trajectories corresponding to A1 and A2. Full lines
show the means of the trajectories, while the points represent the
noisy data forming the dataset.
Figure 1b shows the trajectories of the two probabilistic
internal models p(xDm1) and p(xDm2) (where m1 is the internal
model for A1 and m2 is the internal model for A2) as learned
by using the Echo State Gaussian Process algorithm [35] on
100 time series per action in a supervised learning scheme.
These are considered to be the ‘‘original’’ internal models and
trajectories (i.e., without signaling) in our experiment. The
superposition of the two distributions in the figure represents the
perceiver’s probability of observing the two movements when no
hypothesis is done on which is the action actually being
performed. Figure 1c shows the internal models for the same
two actions (A1 and A2) when the signaling distribution is used
instead. By comparing figure 1b (without signaling) and figure 1c
(with signaling) it can be noted that sampling from the signaling
distribution leads to a characteristic dissimilation effect at the
beginning of the action.
Figure 2a and figure 2b permits to better appreciate this
dissimilation effect. Figure 2a shows the difference between the
trajectories for the action A1 when the original distribution
(blue) or the signaling distribution (magenta) are used. Figure 2b
shows the same difference between the distributions, but at a
particular time step t~250 ms. As evident from the figures, the
differences between the original and the signaling distributions
are not the same throughout the action but are more prominent
at the beginning, where the trajectories of A1 and A2 overlap.
To assess this difference quantitatively, we calculated the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the correct and
incorrect actions (m1 vs. m2) in the original and signaling
distributions, see Figure 2c. Our results indicate that, after a
short initial phase where ambiguity cannot be minimized, the
signaling distribution quickly diverges from the original one; at
the end of the action the signaling trajectory becomes close
again to the original trajectory.
We argued that the effect of signaling and dissimilation is
minimizing the probability of misclassification of a perceiver agent.
To assess this hypothesis, we compared the performance of a
(synthetic) perceiver agent asked to recognize a performed action
when its trajectory is sampled from (i) the original distribution and
(ii) a signaling distribution. The synthetic perceiver agent is modeled
using a Bayesian action recognition method that integrates over
time (noisy) trajectory estimates, see [33] for details.
Figure 2d shows the results of the comparison and the
probability recognizing the two actions m1 and m2 using the
original distribution (blue and red) and the signaling distribution
(magenta and black). The results indicate that the observer agent is
able to recognize the correct action faster when a signaling
distribution is used. Taken together, the results of this synthetic
experiment show that using signaling strategies permitting
dissimilating the two actions in the parts where their trajectories
are more ambiguous; in turn, signaling permits perceivers to
recognize a performed action faster and more accurately.
Experiment 2. Comparison with Human Data
The objective of experiment 2 is is assessing if our method can
be used to model human signaling data. A recent experiment [17]
investigated signaling in a joint task consisting in grasping jointly
and synchronously a bottle-like object in one of two possible
points: up (top of the bottle) or down (bottom of the bottle). In one
condition, only one of the co-actors, called the Leader, knows the
task to be jointly performed (i.e., up-reach or down-reach). Results
show that in this case the Leader modifies her trajectory to signal
her co-actor, called the Follower, the task to be performed.
Specifically, if the Leader is required to do an up-reaching, she
significantly raises the trajectory; if she is required to do a down-
reaching, she significantly lowers the trajectory. Figure 3a shows a
plot of the trajectories obtained in the human study and permits
appreciating the significant differences between the signaling
trajectories and the baseline trajectories (i.e., when no signaling is
required).
We used the proposed signaling method to model the human
data reported in [17]. We firstly acquired the internal models
corresponding to the baseline trajectories (i.e., without signaling)
for reaching up and reaching down. This was done by using the
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baseline human data in a supervised learning scheme, adopting
the Echo State Gaussian Process algorithm [35].
Then, we calculated various signaling distributions using different
values of l, and compared the results to the Leader’s movements
in the human study. Figure 3b shows that without signaling (l~0)
the reconstruction error is higher. The reconstruction error drops
close to zero with various values of l, and the best model of the
data is one in which l changes dynamically over time; see the
dynamics of the l-profile in figure 3c. This result suggests that our
signaling method can successfully model the unfolding of the
Leader’s actions over time. Furthermore, it indicates that the
Leader might modify dynamically her signaling strategies within
trials. One possibility is that the Leader does so depending on the
Follower’s feedback. For example, a Follower could start the trial
with a high level of uncertainty, prompting the Leader’s signaling.
During the trial, the Follower could understand the correct action
and move to the target with increased confidence; the Leader can
use this feedback information to infer that the Follower has no
uncertainty and stop signaling. Note that biomechanical con-
straints and other costs plausibly exert an influence on the
dynamics of l. Indeed, the costs of deviating from the original
trajectory are not constant within trials; in particular, they could
increase at the end of the trajectory when it is important not to
miss the pragmatic goal (e.g., grasping the bottle correctly). Future
studies should address the costs and dynamics of signaling within
and across trials.
Figure 1. Experiment 1. Panel a shows the dataset composed of synthetic data points for two goal-directed actions: A1 (e.g. reach an object to the
left) and A2 (e.g. reach an object to the right). The lines show the trajectories from which the noisy data (shown as circles) were sampled. Synthetic
points were generated by adding Gaussian noise to each trajectory with a signal-to-noise ratio of 18dB. The trajectories were generated with a strong
superposition over the 20% of their time length, in order to simulate movements not simply distinguishable. Panel b shows the probability density of
the superposition of the two original models internal models p(xDm1) and p(xDm2) learned on the dataset of Panel a. The red color represents the
highest probability density values, and the blue color the lowest. Panel c shows the corresponding trajectories of the signaling distributions psig(xDm1)
and psig(xDm2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079876.g001
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Experiment 3: The Case of Three or More Actions
Up to now we have considered the case of two actions A1 and
A2. However, in realistic scenarios each context is linked to
multiple possible actions. In such cases signaling strategies need to
be different depending on what are the (most likely) action
alternatives, say A1 vs. A2 or A1 vs. A3 (or even A1 vs. both A2 and
A3). The aim of Experiment 3 is studying if and how signaling
strategies change depending on the action alternatives.
Figure 4 illustrates this situation in the case of three actions (say,
three goal-directed actions to the left, center, and right). In
particular, Figure 4a shows the trajectories associated with the
three actions, generated using a synthetic dataset that uses the
method elucidated earlier but includes three rather than two
actions. Figure 4b shows the means of the distributions for A1, A2,
and A3 (in blue, red and green, respectively). It shows that
trajectories using the sampling distribution are different if the same
action A1 has to be dissimilated from A3 (A1 vs. A3 shown in
turquoise) or from A2 (A1 vs. A2 shown in magenta). In particular,
a larger and longer deviation from the original trajectory is needed
to dissimilate A1 from A3 than A1 from A2. This difference can be
appreciated by comparing figure 4c and figure 4d that compare
the KL divergence of the original and signaling distributions in the
case of A1 vs. A2 and A1 vs. A3, respectively.
Figure 2. Further analyses of Experiment 1. Panel a shows the means of the original distributions for A1 and A2 in blue and red, respectively. In
magenta the means of the signaling distribution of A1 (i.e., for a leftward movement) is shown. Panel b shows an example of signaling distribution at
a given time step rather than the whole trajectory. Sample distributions p(xt Dm1) and p(xtDm2) are taken at time t~250 ms of the dynamic Gaussian
Process of the two primitives. The parameters of the Gaussian distributions at time t are m1~0:53, m2~0:47, s1~0:06 and s2~0:05. The resulting
distribution psig(xt Dm1;w) is computed from Eq. (2). The weights coefficients are set as w1~w2~1. This means that the two distributions are equally
weighted in the computing of the signaling distribution. Panel c shows the KL divergence between two actions: A1 vs. A2 . Panel d shows the
perceiver’s probability of recognizing the right action (i.e., the probability p(mi Do1:t) of perceiving m1 given the observations o until time t) when the
performer uses the original m1 distribution (blue= left, red = right) and the signaling distribution (magenta= left, black = right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079876.g002
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These results show that signaling strategies are flexible and
tailored to the action alternatives. The success of a signaling
action depends on the action alternatives that are considered.
Let’s imagine that a perceiver action is uncertain between A1
and A3. If the performer uses a signaling action that
disambiguates between A1 and A2 rather than A1 and A3,
he would stop signaling too early and this would make the
perceiver’s task harder. We hypothesize that the performer
modifies its signaling strategies using an estimation of the
perceiver’s belief of the possible alternatives and the associated
uncertainty. This novel empirical prediction of our model
remains to be studied empirically. However, ongoing joint
action experiments with several action alternatives show that the
leader’s movement amplitude contains information about the
target location (which is unknown to the co-actor) and the
amplitude increases when the target-to-target distance increases
(Cordula Vesper, personal communication).
Figure 3. Experiment 2. Panel a shows the average trajectories (Leader vs. baseline condition) to reach the top and bottom of the bottle in the
human study reported in [17]. Panel b shows the reconstruction error (sum of squares error between the human data and the modeled trajectories)
for the trajectories of the Leader, using the signaling distribution and various values of l. The Figure shows a time window in the data, not the whole
trajectory. The specific window is between 0.5 and 0.66 (trajectory length is normalized to 1). Panel c shows a l-profile: the values of optimized l for
each time step t on the sequences of the Leaders’ reaching up movements. It measures the amount of signaling during the reaching up action.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079876.g003
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Discussion
Although the importance of communication is recognized in
several disciplines, it is rarely studied in the context of on-line
social interactions and joint actions. We offered a normative
framework in which a performer agent can decide to pay a cost in
order to send coordination signals and help the co-actor’s
recognition process. In this framework, signaling is not concep-
tualized as an ‘‘altruistic’’ action (although in some cases it can be)
but as part of a strategy for joint action optimization [20]. The
minimization of uncertainty is important in individualistic
planning. Here we extend this argument to joint actions, arguing
that if performers maintain a model of the perceiver agent,
minimizing his uncertainty is part of the optimization and this
entails some form of signaling and communication. Thus,
sensorimotor communication emerges as part of a strategy that
enhances coordination and the success of joint actions.
The Importance of Signaling in Joint Actions
Recent research in social neuroscience has revealed that
understanding the intentions of co-actors and predicting their
next actions are fundamental for successful joint actions and social
interactions, cooperative and competitive. In joint task such as
building something together or running a dialogue, action
understanding helps planning complementary actions and con-
tributes to the success of the joint goal. Furthermore, predictive
mechanisms help the real-time coordination of one’s own and the
co-actor’s actions [36–41].
Figure 4. Experiment 3. Panel a shows the dataset of the synthetic data of the trajectories for actions A1 (left), A2 (right), and A3 (center). The lines
show the sample trajectories from which the noisy data (shown as circles) were sampled. Panel b shows the means of the original distribution of A1
(blue), the means of the original distribution of A3 (green), the means of the original distribution of A2 (red), the means of the signaling distribution
A1 vs. A3 (turquoise), the means of the signaling distribution A1 vs. A2 (magenta). Panels c and d compare the KL divergence of the original and
signaling distributions in the case of A1 vs. A2 and A1 vs. A3 , respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079876.g004
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However, action understanding and prediction are hard and
often under-constrained computational problems, and it is still
unclear how humans (and other animals) solve them in real time
while at the same time planning their complementary or
competitive actions [42–46]. It has been argued that action and
intention recognition are facilitated in joint action but also more in
general in social set-ups because co-actors tend to automatically
‘‘align’’ at multiple levels, imitate each other, and share
representations; in turn, this facilitates prediction, understanding,
and ultimately coordination [42,45,47]. Dynamic theories of joint
action argue that due to alignment processes and the synchroni-
zation of behavior, coordination dynamics could be self-reinforc-
ing, so that joint actions (or at least those requiring only immediate
coordination) do not require cognitive representations [48,49].
Despite the importance of automatic mechanisms, we argue that
co-actors adopt also intentional strategies to enhance coordination.
In keeping with this view, human experiments show that signaling
is versatile and takes into account the communicative implications
of the executed actions, its ambiguity and its costs, as well as the
uncertainty of the co-actor [17,19,20], and for this can be
considered an intentional strategy, although not necessarily
conscious.
We argue that signaling strategies help solving coordination
problems and joint actions by making actions easier to predict and
disambiguate. In the long run, signaling actions can also support
common ground formation by disambiguating an actor’s intended
plan rather than only her next action [3,20,39,50]. Signaling
actions are thus part of a joint action optimization process that
takes the co-actors costs into consideration; similar examples of
collaborative strategies for solving joint problems are the principle
of least collaborative effort [51] and the active management of
resources [52] in dialogue.
An open objective for future research is investigating empirically
the multifarious methods humans use for sensorimotor commu-
nication and signaling, which are not fixed but depend on task
demands and goals [53,54]. We have focused on a specific form of
signaling consisting in modifying the kinematic parameters of a
given internal model; however, there are other methods to convey
communicative message through one’s choice of actions, such as
for example selecting a different internal model that nevertheless
achieves the desired pragmatic goal [20]. Furthermore, our
formulation considers the case where the alternatives are known.
In certain circumstances the producer can be uncertain on the
number of alternatives, or they can be too numerous to be
considered all together. In these cases, the producer can decide to
make the selected action easier to disambiguate by lowering its
variance or by amplifying its specificities; one example is making
the word ‘‘house’’ easier to understand by uttering ‘‘hoooouse’’.
Note also that although we focused principally on cooperative
scenarios, signaling is widely used in competitive set-ups, too, as in
the case of feinting adversaries during volleyball or soccer games
[27,28]. As for cooperative scenarios, the costs and benefits of
feinting can be considered within an action optimization
framework. Note that in some cases signaling actions can also be
detrimental, because trajectory deviations can increase the risk of
missing a target. For example, football players who want to
dissimulate their penalty kick sometimes miss the target. Future
studies are needed to elucidate the functioning of sensorimotor
communication strategies in realistic human interactions.
The Adaptive Value of Communication in Pragmatic
Contexts
When communication is studied in purely communicative
scenarios (e.g., conversations) it is tempting to argue that it
maximizes information measures such as the correct reproduction
of a message, as indeed assumed by prominent frameworks such as
Communication Theory [55]. We studied instead communication
in the context of joint actions in which the pragmatic, non-
communicative goals are more prominent. In joint action set-ups
the adaptive value of communication is linked to the achievement
of pragmatic goals, not to information transmission per se [4,6–9].
Thus, the trade-off between the costs of communication (e.g.,
biomechanical costs, slower performance) and its benefits for
interaction success has to be considered, especially if, as in our
volleyball example, the same ‘‘channels’’ (hand and arm move-
ments) are used for both for action performance and communi-
cation. In our framework signaling and sensorimotor communi-
cation strategies emerge naturally from the objective of optimizing
a joint goal. We believe that the proposed normative framework
can contribute to shed light on the adaptive and evolutionary value
of communication in terms of enhanced coordination and joint
action success rather than only in terms of the maximization of
information transmission.
The theory we have presented does not require that the
perceiver recognizes the communicative nature of the performer’s
action, i.e., that the performer intended to communicate. Still,
several researchers argue that recognizing the communicative
intention is be a fundamental element of pedagogical contexts [56]
and linguistic communication [5]. It is worth noting that if the
perceiver uses the computational framework elucidated in this
article, he could be able to to distinguish a communicative from a
non-communicative action by recognizing if the perceived action
was generated using an ‘‘original’’ distribution or a ‘‘signaling’’
distribution. The latter is often not the optimal trajectory to
achieve a pragmatic goal and this information can be used to
estimate communicative intent. Future studies will need to
elucidate the importance of recognizing communicative intention
in joint actions, besides pedagogical contexts.
The current model has some limitations that should be
addressed by future research. First, we adopted a simplified action
execution model that does not consider action biomechanics,
muscle activation, and detailed planning mechanisms. Further-
more, for the sake of simplicity we assumed that the costs of
signaling (e.g., biomechanical costs, costs for planning unfamiliar
trajectories) are proportional to the amount of the deviation from
the ‘‘original’’ trajectory. These limitations can be overcome by
introducing in our formulation more detailed action models based
on optimal control theory [57,58]. A second limitation is that the
performer’s choice of the amount of signaling l is not explicitly
modeled. In the human experiment described in section 0 l varies
over time, but it remains to be empirically assessed which factors
(e.g., the perceiver’s feedback, the varying biomechanical costs)
affect it. A more complete approach should consider the
perceiver’s behavior and the reciprocal interactions between
performer and perceiver, including the fact that they can build a
model of one another. Finally, the cost-benefit analysis of Eq. 4 is
demanding and it is unclear if and how the brain might implement
it. The more demanding part consists in calculating the perceiver’s
benefits for each level of l. In cognitive science and neuroscience,
it has been proposed that action perception can be implemented as
a mental simulation that reuses the same internal model as those
used for action control [59]; several computational models have
been proposed that implement this process [33,60–62]. A similar
mechanism could allow simulating the perceiver’s action observa-
tion process. In keeping with this view,recent evidence indicates
that the neural underpinnings of the ability to tailor the
communicative message to the receiver could overlap with the
brain substrate for intention recognition [63–65]. Developing
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computationally feasible solutions for such computations remains
an important open issue.
Another promising direction for future research is linking more
directly the proposed approach to established frameworks in
computational motor control and social interaction. The proposed
theory can be linked to existing models of Bayesian decision theory
and reward-directed motor control [66–68] by reformulating the
costs and benefits of signaling in terms of a reward function. In this
framework, the choice of signaling or not signaling would result
from the optimization of the reward function rather than eq. 4.
The proposed theory would also benefit from a linkage with game
theory, which is an established framework for studying coordination
problems. in this vein, a few recent studies linked sensorimotor or
cognitive processes to equivalent game-theoretic concepts, but did
not consider communication [69–71]. Different from game theory,
our framework aims at clarifying the micro-dynamics and
cognitive mechanisms that support joint actions; linking game-
theoretic concepts to cognitive mechanisms could help realizing
theories of coordination dynamics that span several levels or
explanation. Our proposed method of joint action optimization
resonates with game-theoretic concepts of team reasoning [72,73];
exploring the linkage between these concepts is an open objective
for future research.
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